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François Hotman and the Nationalist Origins  
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ABSTRACT
The rise of  constitutional self- government in early modern Europe, I argue, owes 
much to a nationalist liberation narrative pioneered by French Huguenot François 
Hotman in Francogallia (1573). In response to appeals by absolutist thinkers to Ro-
man law, which put the power of  the king beyond legal or constitutional restraint, 
Hotman wove together tales of  the heroism of  ancient Gauls and Franks wresting 
their native liberties back from the Romans with a theory of  constitutionally limited 
government grounded in the common law of  France. This type of  narrative was 
adapted by Dutch and English thinkers who sought to defend constitutionalism in 
their respective countries. Through this examination of  early modern liberation 
narratives, I argue we can gain insight on the relationship between nationalism and 
resistance to autocratic governments and the formation of  regimes consistent with 
the principles of  constitutional self- government.
KEYWORDS:  Constitutionalism, Nationalism, Social Contract Theory, Common Law, Popular Sovereignty, 
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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of  WWII, nationalism has had a bad reputation. While prominent 
liberal and cosmopolitan theorists have reformulated conceptions of  constitutional 
democracy to transcend nationalism, important historians of  political thought have 
effectively expunged nationalism from the history of  constitutionalism, presenting 
the latter as a process that leads teleologically to John Locke’s universalist, natural 
rights based theory of  government, in which the concept of  nationhood does not 
figure.1 Other scholars who acknowledge the importance of  nationalism to the de-
velopment of  constitutional self- government, or who posit a relationship between 
certain kinds of  nationalism, nevertheless miss what is politically distinctive about 
early- modern nationalism.2 The purpose of  this essay is to show how nationalism 
grounded early- modern arguments for constitutional self- government. This study 
will demonstrate, at the least, that existing understandings of  the growth of  Euro-
pean constitutionalism should be reconsidered. Beyond this it is suggested that the 
examination of  the link between nationalism and early modern constitutionalism 
may be of  use to those engaged with the problems of  preserving constitutional self- 
government where it now exists, or establishing or restoring it where it is now absent.
This essay proceeds in five parts. First I explore what is lacking in universal-
ist accounts of  constitutional self- government in general, and how the secondary 
literature on the monarchomachs, with its focus on Roman and natural law, tends 
to ignore the important question of  what makes the notion of  a permanent pre- 
political community with imprescriptible rights plausible. Second, I describe how 
the absolutist arguments of  the period effectively denied the existence or the rele-
vance of  a pre- political community, and appealed specifically to Roman public law 
and Roman history to debunk common law restrictions on the power of  princes, 
and the principle of  government by the consent of  the governed. Third, I demon-
strate how Hotman’s nationalist account supplies the conceptual and rhetorical 
deficiencies of  abstract formulations of  popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, 
drawn, in this case, from the abstractions of  the Roman public and private law, 
and later from claims about the natural rights of  human beings. I also point to 
some of  the features of  the nationalism of  the Francogallia that make it compatible 
with a regime restrained by law and accountability to the people in ways that other 
forms of  nationalism may not be. In the fourth section of  this essay, I show how 
1. Of  the contemporary theorists, see Habermas (1996), Hayward (2007); Muller (2007). Of  the 
historians, see Franklin (1979), Salmon (1959), Skinner (1978), Tuck (1982).
2. See Greenfeld (1992) and Hont (1994).
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seminal texts in the development of  Dutch and English constitutionalism, namely, 
Hugo Grotius’ Antiquity of  the Batavian Republic and John Selden’s The English Janus, 
were modeled on the Francogallia. Finally, in the Conclusion, I suggest some possible 
valuable lessons that modern political theorists might learn from Hotman’s form 
of  nationalism.
I. THE FAILURES OF THE UNIVERSALIST ACCOUNT
My essential claim is that the national- historical arguments of  thinkers such as 
François Hotman contributed to the development of  modern constitutional self- 
government something fundamentally different from what has been acknowledged 
hitherto. Hotman was an important and influential member of  a school of  Hu-
guenot thinkers known as “monarchomachs” who challenged the idea of  abso-
lute monarchy in the late 16th century, a group that included Theodore Beza and 
Phillipe de Mornay. For the monarchomach writers, a nation is not a voluntary 
association of  individuals, and the attachments to it are not defined by individual 
self- interest or agreement on universal principles. The tradition of  popular self- 
rule is thus associated not with individualism, but with the republican idea of  civic 
virtue located in a pre- political community. (Canovan 1996, 22–3; Yack, 2001). In 
Hotman’s account, in particular, liberty and self- rule require that citizens have a 
primordial attachment to a specific fatherland.
As Margaret Canovan observes, the Lockean liberal tradition has a tendency 
“to blur the differences between polities and voluntary associations, and to repre-
sent the democratic polity as a kind of  expanded tennis club” (1996, 21).3 Hotman’s 
account appealed not only to reason, but also to the common sentiments, experi-
ences and memories that generate and sustain communities. Hotman and his imi-
tators rhetorically reconstituted “confused multitudes” as “nations” who possessed 
sufficient solidarity, virtue, and experience to govern themselves, and mobilized 
support for specific established institutions which had real potential for the realiza-
tion of  restraint on political power and self- government.4 One should not overstate 
3. See Locke ([1690] 1994): What “constitutes any Political Society, is nothing but the consent of  any 
number of  Freemen,” §89. See also §116: children are “born . . . Subject of  no Country or Government.” 
4. The phrase “confused multitude, without order or connexion” appears in the final chapter of  Locke 
([1690] 1994), §212, §219. There, in spite of  the assertion that the “community,” once formed, is a 
permanent body, which continues even when government is in abeyance, Locke’s rhetoric suggests that 
the dissolution of  the legislative assembly or the non- enforcement of  the laws by the executive is liable 
to cause the death and dissolution of  the community as well. This actually makes sense, if, as Locke’s 
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the value of  Hotman and other similar writers to political theory. On broader ques-
tions of  human nature, justice, and the good life, they cannot compete with more 
abstract thinkers, and their assertions are also often question- begging. But their 
focus on the relationship between general principles, national identity, and existing 
institutions provides a useful complement to the theories of  more celebrated polit-
ical philosophers.
Historical scholarship, especially that of  Quentin Skinner, Richard Tuck, Ju-
lian Franklin, and John Salmon tends to treat monarchomach writers as figures 
who produced various conceptual nuggets all of  which John Locke was able, in the 
fullness of  time, to bring together in his universalist theory of  human rights and 
constitutional government based on the consent of  rational, rights- bearing individ-
uals (Skinner 1978, vol. 2, 239–40, 318, 338; Franklin 1979, 71–79, 94–97).5 Frank-
lin credits the monarchomachs’ bold assertion of  two ideas: popular sovereignty 
and institutionalized restraint on royal power (1969, 12–13). In fact both ideas had 
been commonplace in mediaeval Europe, and, though not ascendant, were voiced 
frequently in early modern France (Ullman 1965; Church 1941, 86). Other schol-
ars focus on the relationship between Hotman’s constitutional theory and Roman 
law (Lee, 2008). But in Francogallia, such arguments are overshadowed by appeals 
to native history and nativist sentiment.6 Rhetorically, in fact, Roman law and the 
Roman people are more useful to Hotman as enemies and oppressors of  the French 
nation and their ancestral liberties, which is another reason why he “obscures his 
own reliance upon civil law concepts” (Giesey 1961, 20).7
theory suggests, the only bond of  unity for a community is its members’ recognition of  a common 
legislative power and obedience to the same laws.
5. Salmon (1959) mentions the nationalist cast of  Hotman’s Francogallia, but he ignores how Dutch and 
English authors mimicked this kind of  nationalist narrative. Tuck (1993) mentions Hotman’s Franks 
and Gauls, Grotius’ use of  the Batavian myth, and Selden and Nathaniel Bacon’s use of  the Anglo- 
Saxon myth, but these discourses are stops along the way to the “great natural law theories of  the 
mid- century.” 
6. Hotman’s emphasis is in contrast with the works of  Beza (1576) and de Mornay ([1579] 1994), in 
which all sorts of  arguments are employed in more or less equal measure, including a wide range of  
evidence from the Bible, histories of  ancient Greece and Rome and of  mediaeval European states, 
Roman law, and natural law. French history does not receive significantly more emphasis than other 
materials. The Rights of  Magistrates does not have the nationalistic tone of  Hotman’s Francogallia at all. 
The postscriptal poem of  Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, with its call to restore the ancient honor of  Gaul, is 
reminiscent of  Francogallia, but the rest of  the work does not have this quality.
7. Hotman expends much more energy attacking the “foreign” Romans and the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
than putatively native sources of  interpretations of  French constitution unfavourable to his own, for 
instance the Salic Law, which is discussed only in chapter VIII (see Geisey 1961, 20–21). Although 
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John Pocock comes closest to appreciating the nationalist aspect of  Hotman’s 
work, discerning in it a precursor to romantic nationalism (1987, 15). However, 
the essence of  ancient constitutionalism for Pocock is a kind of  legal thinking in 
which legitimacy is conferred upon a regime by its immemoriality (1987, 17). It is 
true that much of  Hotman’s account is framed in this way, but the legal argument 
serves, for the most part, as a vehicle for deeper claims about the nature of  political 
communities, the rights of  nations, and the national character of  the French. His 
argument is designed to answer precisely the sort of  questions that theories limited 
to abstract rights and legal principles cannot and that, as some scholars argue, must 
be answered to make constitutional self- government tenable. One has to know who 
the people are, what the community of  sentiment is within which men owe special 
duties to one another, within which there is indeed a common good to be sought. 
There must also be some common basis for agreement on the constitutional form 
and the basic laws.
Hotman’s account of  the national past would not meet the standards of  mod-
ern historiography.8 But even if  such stories can be shown to be mostly fictional, 
that does not mean that writers can invent effective political narratives ex nihilo, or 
even that such writers are aware that they are engaged in mythopoesis. If  national 
identities are to some degree “constructed” by political entrepreneurs, this does not 
mean that nations can be “constructed, adapted, or dismantled to order” (Canovan 
1996, 13). As Rogers Smith notes “forms of  political peoplehood . . . are largely 
generated, motivated, and also meaningfully limited by the particular range of  sto-
ries of  possible political identity that they have inherited and long valued” (1999, 
48). Political actors are largely constrained to work with narratives that are already 
familiar, both to themselves and to their intended audience. The same sort of  ge-
nealogy of  the French nation and constitution laid out by Hotman was arrived at 
independently by other political thinkers of  his time who did not share his partisan 
commitments (Major 1980, 184–7). At least among the literate, there were some 
common ways of  understanding the French past that did not accord with the uni-
versalist assumptions of  Lockean liberalism.
Hotman also gives cause to re- examine some of  the typologies of  national-
ism and the relationships some scholars have alleged between said typologies and 
Hotman draws upon the constitutional tradition of  the Roman republic, and certain aspects of  
Roman law, he rejects those parts of  the Corpus Iuris Civilis from the period of  the Empire, which royal 
officials had used to support absolutism (Kinneging 1997, 111–112, 244, 271). 
8. Compare for instance, Hotman’s account of  the “War of  the Common Weal” against Louis XI, 
summarized on page 51, to that of  a modern historian: Major (1960, 54–58).
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political regimes. Istvan Hont (1994) and Liah Greenfeld (1992) both characterize 
French nationalism as an ideology aimed at the centralization of  political power 
and the homogenization of  a population not yet sufficiently “national.” One of  
the more extreme forms of  this nationalizing state is seen in Emmanuel Sieyes’s 
proposal to liquidate, redivide, and homogenize the old provinces of  France (Hont 
1994, 200).
Greenfeld contrasts “collectivist” nationalism, which she traces back to Hot-
man, with the purportedly “individualist” nationalism of  England (1992, 30–31, 
108–109). On her account, collectivist nationalisms lead to authoritarianism, and 
individualist ones to democracy and prosperity. A closer look at the nationalisms of  
Hotman, Grotius, and Selden casts doubt on the veracity of  these distinctions and 
claims. Unlike the authoritarian nationalism that Hont and Greenfeld observe in 
late 18th century France, the early modern nationalism of  Hotman and his Dutch 
and English imitators is opposed to a centralizing and homogenizing state, and 
while it leaves room for the rights of  individual citizens, its distinctive feature, which 
reveals its mediaeval roots, is the dignity it accords to the settled rights and privi-
leges of  the estates, the provinces, and other corporate bodies of  nation. Properly 
understood, the mediaeval and early modern nation is a community of  communi-
ties.9 Historians of  mediaeval nationalism argue that it was the enduring strength 
of  such subordinate partialities, and the capacity of  subnational communities to 
resist the central government, that prevented nationalism in the Middle Ages from 
developing into the extreme forms that appeared in the late 18th, 19th, and 20th 
centuries (Tipton 1972, 47, 88). Greenfeld sees a sort of  Lockean individualism 
as the basis of  a moderate nationalism consistent with constitutional restraint and 
protection of  rights. But the influential early modern proponents of  constitutional 
liberty examined here, in whose works no such individualism is evident, point to 
different conclusions.
II. HOTMAN’S REJECTION OF THE ABSOLUTIST POSITION
The Francogallia was written in response to narratives which declared the French 
king to be an absolute sovereign, accountable neither to the common law nor to 
the assembly of  the estates. According to such stories the French people had no ex-
istence as a coherent body prior to the arrival of  the ancestors of  the present royal 
family, much less a power to rule themselves as one body. By this account the Franks 
were originally Trojans. Like those who went on to found Rome, these Frankish 
9. See Althusius ([1601] 1995), and chapter 5 of  Levy (2015).
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Trojans conquered the territory that is now France and established their kingdom 
there. Being of  the same lineage with the founders of  Rome when the Roman 
Empire fell, the French descendants of  the Trojans inherited the Roman imperium 
(Foucault 2003, 115–116). Hence, the French king could base his right to rule on 
two ancient lineages. First, the French king is a descendant of  the Trojans, who 
founded France. Second, the French king is the inheritor of  the Roman imperium. 
The implication of  first lineage is that the royal family is, physically and juridically, 
the founder of  the nation. The French people, then, “derive their origin from their 
kings—as the Roman people is said to have been created by Romulus because there 
had not been an original people before but a multitude scraped together from a va-
riety of  nations and peoples” (Beza [1576] 1956, 44).10 Before the first French King 
created the nation, as Romulus created the Romans, there was only a confused 
multitude of  disparate tribes with no unity or coherence, no common customs or 
laws, and, hence, no capacity for self-rule. The implication of  the second ancient 
lineage is that the relationship between the king and people in France is of  the same 
character as that between the Roman emperors and the subjects of  the empire 
(Foucault 2003, 116).
The essence of  the absolutist doctrine, as formulated by such figures as Guil-
laume Bude, Michel de L’Hopital, and ultimately Jean Bodin, was the claim that 
kings had power to act as final interpreters of  all laws, to take whatever measures 
they thought necessary for the common good without needing the consent of  any 
other institution (Keohane 1980, 4). No absolutist claimed for the king a right to 
violate natural and divine law, but a king’s submission to such strictures could only 
be understood as “voluntary,” for no other institution or person in the kingdom had 
a right to restrain or resist the king (Keohane 1980, 61, 66, 72; Allen 1941, 285, 
292; Church 1941, 61–63).
One of  the arguments employed by Hotman against absolutist claims was the 
assertion that the people, as a body, was immortal, and as such, its rights as a col-
lective were imprescriptible (Hotman [1573] 1972, 399–401; Salmon 1959, 42; 
Lee 2008, 389). The assertion was an attempt to negate absolutist claims from 
usucapion according to which long possession established ownership, in this case, the 
king’s ownership of, and hence, his absolute authority over the realm (Lee 2008, 
388–389). Claiming that the people is an immortal body is a typical early modern 
way of  asserting the state’s accountability to a pre- political community. Yet there 
10. Theodore Beza, fellow Huguenot and monarchomach, notes that this argument is deployed by 
absolutists, and takes pains to show that other nations, especially France, were not created by their kings 
as the Romans are said to have been (1576).
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was something larger at stake. For if  a people cannot exist as a coherent body with-
out a king to bind its members together with his laws, if  there was no French nation 
until ancient kings created it by imposing their will on confused multitudes, then 
it is absurd to speak of  the original and imprescriptible rights of  the people. For a 
people to have common rights, it first must be a people. In effect, the absolutist asks, 
The people has rights? What people? Hotman answers in the Francogallia—turning, 
as Bernard Yack puts it, to an “identification of  the people with the nation” (Yack 
2001, 524)—this people here, descended from these tribes, with this distinct national 
character, and these customs.
Similarly, Hotman asserts that the right of  a people to government by the con-
sent of  the governed—based on the principle that “what touches all should be ap-
proved by all,” and the “celebrated liberty of  holding of  common council”—is part 
of  the law of  nations. Such natural rights belong, potentially, to all peoples, except-
ing “the Turks, or those like them” whose absolute monarchs treat their subjects 
“like slaves or cattle” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 297, 301, 305, 317).11 But to exercise 
a right of  nations, a multitude must be a nation. Thus, one of  Hotman’s tasks is to 
show that the French have had such status since ancient times and do not owe their 
peoplehood to the genius or the violence of  any king or lawgiver.
III. HOTMAN’S THEORY IN FRANCOGALLIA
In Francogallia, Hotman makes four major accomplishments. First, he substantiates 
the otherwise abstract notion of  a pre- political community with a narrative about 
the origins and development of  the French nation. Second, he grounds his argu-
ments for a particular constitutional form on the immemorial traditions of  the 
French nation, which many generations of  courageous ancestors had fought to pre-
serve, rather than in terms of  a voluntarist narrative of  self- interested agreement. 
By formulating his argument so, he transforms the nation and the constitution from 
abstractions into objects capable of  engendering the sort of  public affection and 
civic obligation which he regards as a necessity for citizens of  a constitutional and 
self- governing polity. Third, Hotman gives an account of  native liberty confront-
ing foreign tyranny, using past examples of  rebellion, deposition, and expulsion 
to inspire action against present tyrants who are shown to behave like the alien 
11. Hotman uses the civil law axiom, quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur, but speaks of  it in general 
terms as “an attribute of  liberty”. All of  his examples of  peoples who have had or retain these rights 
are European: the ancient Greeks and Romans, the English, the Germans, the Spaniards (see [1573] 
1972, 299–317).
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oppressors of  old. Finally, he defends a mixed constitution, in which sovereignty 
is shared between the provinces and the national government, and, at the national 
level, between the king and the three estates, as the ancient and authentic form of  
government of  the French nation.
A. Hotman’s Narrative of the Origin of the French Nation
Although Hotman uses various terms for “nation” or “people”, (gens, patria, populus, 
universitas,) which can have different connotations, he holds consistently to a funda-
mental distinction between the nation and the state (civitas or respublica). Properly 
understood, a nation (patria or gens) is not a voluntary association of  individuals; it is 
a given, a primordial, natural union based on blood, custom, language, and a tribal, 
familial affection for one’s conationals. The state, on the other hand, is not a given; 
it is something that a nation, or nations choose to create. The nation is the perma-
nent natural body and the state an impermanent artificial body. Hotman’s claims 
about the pre- political unity of  the ancient Gaullish and Frankish nations may 
strain our credulity, but one understands why he makes them. Given the absolutist 
theory that nations are, in essence, created by kings, and sustained in their unity by 
the power of  kings, he cannot concede that having a king or common magistrates is 
a key factor in the creation of  nations. It is therefore common ethnic factors, blood, 
custom, language, that are, in his account, constitutive of  nationhood. This must be 
the case if  the state is to be considered accountable to the nation, and it is on these 
assumptions that Hotman constructs his historical narrative.
In Hotman’s account, the pre- political community has two different manifes-
tations, first as the two nations described by Roman historians, the Gauls and the 
Franks, and second, as a French nation that developed over time from an amalgama-
tion of  Gauls and Franks. Hotman dismisses out of  hand the absolutist Trojan myth 
of  the origins of  the French state, and begins his account with descriptions of  these 
two nations (Hotman [1573] 1972, 197). Before the Roman conquest, says Hotman, 
the Gaulish nation (gens Gallorum) was divided into autonomous regions governed by 
individual princes or aristocratic assemblies. Yet Gaul was not merely a collection 
of  autonomous communities; rather, there was much common to all: “they not only 
observed the same language, customs and laws but also recognized the same magis-
trates” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 149). The ancient Gauls were thus one nation, bound 
together in solidarity by common language, customs, laws, and leaders. The one 
thing they did not have was a king or sovereign of  all the Gauls. Indeed, not only did 
they not require a sovereign to unify them as a nation, but they were intent on living 
without one. As Hotman affirms, “these people abhorred kingly rule. According to 
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Caesar, ‘when Celtillus, the father of  Vercingetorix, held the supreme power and 
authority and obtained control of  the whole of  Gaul, his people put him to death 
for seeking to acquire a crown’ ” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 153).
Hotman also catalogues the references of  ancient and mediaeval historians 
to the “Frankish nation” (gens Francorum). “[T]he original Franks,” he concludes, 
“came from that area lying between the Elbe, the Rhine and the sea . . . ‘a peo-
ple (populus)’, as Tacitus says, ‘who were the most noble among the Germans, and 
maintained their greatness by following the path of  justice’ ” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 
191). This “people,” the Franks, who won Tacitus’ admiration, were like other Ger-
mans in that they elected their kings but unlike other Germans in that they refused 
to pay tribute to the Romans (Hotman [1573] 1972, 207). More will be said in 
section C (p. 47ff) about the characteristics Hotman ascribes to the Franks and the 
Gauls. At issue here is Hotman’s insistence that the ancestors of  the French were 
established, self- conscious nations, each with its own customs and identity, rather 
than raw human material that could be moulded into whatever shape a royal or 
imperial master might wish.
B. The Roots of the French Constitution
These two nations, the Franks and the Gauls, were, by Hotman’s account, prior to 
the French state and the first “French” king. What would later be called the French 
state first arose from an alliance of  the Franks and the Gauls against their common 
oppressor, the Romans. The first king of  the Francogallia was elected at a public 
council of  the “twin-born nations (gemellae gentes)” who had formed one state (Hot-
man [1573] 1972, 214):
By the time of  [Merovech’s] death a single state had been created by the two 
peoples, the Gauls and the Franks (e duabus Gallorum et Francorum gentibus civitate 
facta), and with a common mind they all elected Childeric, the son of  Merovech, 
as king. They placed him upon a shield according to their custom, bore him thrice 
upon their shoulders round the assembly and saluted him as king of  Francogallia 
(Hotman [1573] 1972, 217).
Several aspects of  this beginning merit attention, for Hotman’s account differs 
markedly from more abstract conceptualizations of  the establishment of  commu-
nities and states. According to Hotman the state was a creation of  the two allied 
nations, two historic communities each with long established bonds of  kinship and 
custom. There is no hint of  the conceit of  later social contract theorists, such as 
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Locke and Rousseau, that political communities were first formed by an act of  con-
sent of  free individuals. Hotman, moreover, specifies no precise founding moment, 
no original act of  consent. “By the time of  Merovech’s death,” he says, “a single 
state had been created” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 217).
The election of  a king by the two peoples is significant in several ways. First, 
it establishes historically the priority of  the people over the king; they created him, 
and not he them. Yet, the argument concerns not the chronology only, but also the 
nature of  the things. According to his conception of  nationhood, no king could 
ever create a nation by imposing his will on a multitude of  individuals. A nation 
is more permanent than a king precisely because a nation cannot be created by 
a single act of  will or consent, whereas a king can. In Hotman’s conception, the 
members of  the “pre- political” community have ties of  kinship, common memo-
ries and experiences, heroes and villains, common customs and institutions. These 
are the sorts of  things that make a nation. A body that has such bonds has already 
achieved a degree of  permanence: no act of  a conqueror or lawgiver can negate it 
or impose a new identity upon it.
The election of  a king by the Gauls and Franks is significant, also, as a manifes-
tation of  the common experience and kindred political culture of  the two nations, 
preserved through many generations, which allowed them to act “with one mind” 
on this occasion. This act by itself  did not create the state, for it had already been 
created, nor, for that matter, did it weld the Gauls and Franks together into one 
nation. The creation of  the Francogallican state was facilitated by the shared po-
litical traditions of  the two nations, already so similar that it was “as if  they were 
twin-born” (quasi gemellae gentes), and their long struggle against a common enemy 
(Hotman [1573] 1972, 284).
The creation of  one French nation also cannot be attributed to any act of  a 
lawgiver or to the will of  an aggregate of  individuals. “French” nationhood came 
about through intermingling and assimilation of  the Gauls and Franks. Hotman 
quotes the observations of  chronicler Hunibaldus: “the Franks intermingled with 
the Gauls and took their daughters to wife. The children of  these unions assimi-
lated both their language and their customs, with which they have become increas-
ingly familiar down to the present day” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 217–219). Two 
nations, already similar in their customs, melded into one. This one nation, whose 
members are all bound by ties of  kinship, “one language and one set of  institutions 
and customs,” has, by Hotman’s account, persisted over a thousand years (Hotman 
[1573] 1972, 285).
Hotman’s account of  the origins of  French nationhood and statehood thus ac-
complishes at least two things. First, he gives substance to the abstract claim that the 
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common rights of  the body of  the nation ought to be understood as imprescriptible. 
The rights of  the permanent body, the nation, are prior to those of  the imperma-
nent, the state. The reader knows the nation is the permanent body because Hot-
man has given it flesh and bones, he has traced its origins to historic communities, 
and he has shown the common endeavors of  these communities—in this case the 
creation of  a new state—and the continuity of  the nation over time. Second, the 
defense of  popular sovereignty in these terms before a mass audience, or at least 
before that portion of  the population that is literate and participates in politics, will 
tend to inspire a deeper, more primordial national consciousness in the population.
Hotman’s casting of  the pre- political community, in which sovereignty ulti-
mately resides, in racial, cultural, and historical terms suggests a relationship be-
tween the citizen and the community contrary to the individualism and voluntarism 
of  the Lockean social contract. Membership in the nation, as Hotman understands 
it, is an inherited status and a feeling of  connectedness akin to that of  a tribe; it is 
not a matter of  individual choice. Hotman makes this explicit in his preface to the 
Francogallia, where he argues that commitment to constitutional self- government 
requires that the citizens of  a polity have a nationalist disposition. He refutes the old 
saying that “A man’s country is wherever he finds content,” an attitude he associates 
with Cynics, who style themselves citizens of  the world free from obligations to any 
particular nation, and Epicureans, who value their own individual pleasure above 
all. Such a disposition is immoral:
For if  it seem a crime, and all but blasphemy to bear impatiently the humours, 
and even the asperity, of  family elders, how much greater is it an offence to resent 
our native country, which the wise have always unanimously preferred to natural 
parents. He is a foolish man who would calculate his affection for his country in 
proportion to the advantages it brings him (Hotman [1573] 1972, 137).
In this analogy, typical of  both ancient republicanism and modern nationalism, the 
duty of  a citizen to his fatherland (patria) is like the duty of  the son to his father.12 
Though the fatherland may provide fewer advantages to its native sons than other 
polities, or, worse, inflict undeserved torments on them, they still have irrecusable 
duties to it, just as sons have to their fathers, who raised and nurtured them.
On Hotman’s account, such a commitment, irrespective of  individual self- 
interest, is necessary for the preservation of  liberty. Alluding to “the many monstrous 
12. The family is, for obvious reasons, the most common metaphor for the nation (see Grosby 2005, 
43–56).
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tyrants in Rome, who afflicted ordinary men, as well as those citizens deserving well 
of  their fatherland,” he asks rhetorically, “Should good citizens reject all care and 
solicitude for their country on that account?” If  the Cynics and the Epicureans are 
right, then this is precisely what oppressed citizens should do: leave their fatherland, 
and settle wherever they find the most advantages, pleasures, and comforts. But 
such a philosophy hands victory to tyrants. Citizens should care for their fatherland 
“as one who is oppressed and unfortunate, and implores the aid of  its native born” 
(Hotman [1573] 1972, 139). The suppression of  tyranny and the preservation of  
liberty in a particular place require that citizens be patriots, that they value the 
liberty and the honor of  their nation more than their own pleasure and comfort, 
more, even, than their own lives. Such patriotism is based on a primal affection and 
attachment to one’s native land and people. The good citizen is like Odysseus “who 
preferred his native land of  Ithica, fixed like some tiny nest to its harsh and jagged 
rock, to all the delights, and to the very kingdom, which Calypso offered him” 
(Hotman [1573] 1972, 137).
This primordial attachment of  the citizen to his native people and land is 
central to Hotman’s project in at least two respects. First, liberty is taken to be 
something that can be secured only in a national community, where most citizens 
have an affection for their conationals based on their shared national inheritance, 
where most possess “a certain inborn love of  fatherland which can no more be 
renounced than any other human attribute” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 137). Second, 
the core of  Hotman’s rhetorical strategy is an appeal to citizens’ piety for the 
“homes of  their fathers and ancestors,” and to the outrage they would feel if  they 
saw them violated (Hotman [1573] 1972, 139). The text is meant to cultivate in 
his readers the same feeling for the “ancient constitution” he would have them 
“restore.”
C. Native Liberty and Foreign Tyranny
In his historical account, Hotman establishes the Gauls and the Franks to have 
been valiant lovers of  liberty, who won their independence at great cost from the 
tyrannical Roman Empire. He traces this theme through subsequent French history 
underlining the bravery of  the French in preserving their birthright, a native con-
stitution that protected their liberties and advanced the common good, in the face 
of  corrupt kings who attempted to impose despotic Roman laws upon them. It is, 
in essence, a story of  pristine native freedom holding out against depraved foreign 
tyranny. The call to restore the ancient constitution, and with it, the liberty and 
welfare of  the nation, is framed as an appeal to expel a poisonous foreign element, 
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which in recent times has crept in, and to take inspiration from courageous ances-
tors who won such battles before.
The first few chapters of  the Francogallia provide lineages of  the Gauls and 
Franks as heroic races that loved liberty and as nations with recognized national 
institutions of  popular government. The Gauls and Franks had a character suitable 
to self- government, a character which the French nation inherited. According to 
Hotman, all the regions of  Gaul “accepted the general practice of  holding a public 
council of  the nation at a fixed time of  the year . . . [where] they decided whatever 
seemed appropriate for the greatest good of  the commonwealth” (Hotman [1573] 
1972, 147). The existence of  this national institution was confirmed by passages 
from Caesar: “They asked whether it was permitted to proclaim a council of  the 
whole of  Gaul for a certain day . . . A council of  all Gaul was summoned at Bilbrax, 
and there a great multitude assembled” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 149). The ancient 
Gauls, then, in Hotman’s interpretation of  the ancient texts, had nascent national 
institutions of  self- government, which they insisted on exercising even after the 
Romans had come among them. The regional princes and magistrates of  Gaul, 
furthermore, exercised no authority like that of  the Roman emperors. They did 
not inherit their power, and “did not possess an unlimited, free and uncontrolled 
authority, but were so circumscribed by specific laws that they were no less under 
the authority and power of  the people than the people were under theirs” (Hotman 
[1573] 1972, 155). In ancient Gaul, then, the rule of  kings was circumscribed by 
law and subject to the consent of  the people, expressed at annual public councils.
Hotman also asserts that this political liberty was the key to the power and 
success of  the ancient Gauls. While they remained free, they were among the most 
fearsome of  the European nations in war. Even “the Romans feared the armed 
strength of  no other nation as they did that of  Gaul.” He cites the judgment of  
Tacitus that “there was a time when the Gauls exceeded even the Germans in 
valour, and carried war to their furthest boundaries, sending colonies across the 
Rhine because of  the pressure of  their own numbers” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 173). 
Furthermore, the Gauls continued valiant in war as long as they remained free. 
Once they lost their liberty, however, their valor disappeared also (Hotman [1573] 
1972, 175).
The Franks were no less to be admired for their political liberty, courage and 
martial prowess than the Gauls. The very name of  the Franks indicates their free-
dom: “those who declared themselves foremost in the recovery of  liberty called 
themselves FRANKS, by which they were understood among the Germans to 
mean free men, exempt from servitude” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 201). The Franks 
had the same relation to their kings as the Gauls had to theirs: “they considered 
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it their duty to keep their honest liberty, even when they were under the authority 
of  kings . . . When they appointed kings for themselves, they were not appointing 
tyrants and butchers, but rather guardians, governors and tutors for their liberty” 
(Hotman [1573] 1972, 205). In the chapter on the deposition of  kings Hotman 
recites at great length all the recorded instances of  the Franks removing their kings 
for abuse of  power or incompetence (Hotman [1573] 1972, 235–245). Frankish 
kings also possessed nothing resembling the Roman imperium. They were permitted 
to rule only if  they protected the liberty of  the people. Like the Gauls, the free 
Franks were also fierce in warfare. According to one account: “When the passions 
of  Franks turn to war, their strength exceeds that of  other peoples, and it propels 
them on with a surge of  fury beyond the narrow seas, so that they have even in-
fested the coasts of  Spain with their armed might” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 195).
In these chapters on the history of  the ancient Gauls and Franks Hotman 
breaks the chain tying the French political order to that of  Rome by pointing to 
the pre- Roman origins of  a distinctive tradition of  political liberty in the practices 
of  the two ancient nations that later formed France. In addition, he shows that the 
liberty- loving ancestors of  the French were able to make good use of  their liberty; 
they were admired and feared by others for their strength and prowess. Such a 
portrait of  these ferocious and free ancestors would also make them admirable to 
their descendants.
Hotman’s account of  the encounter of  the Gauls and the Franks with the Ro-
mans is perhaps the most rabble- rousing portion of  the text. It is a symbolic re-
jection of  arguments for absolute monarchy derived from the conquest thesis and 
Roman law presented in the form of  a paean to courageous ancestors who rebelled 
against a foreign oppressor and expelled the foe from their country. Though the 
Romans, under the command of  Julius Caesar, managed to subdue Gaul, it was 
a feat that was accomplished only after many “disastrous setbacks” in a war that 
continued almost ten years. Gaul was reduced to a “threefold servitude” by the 
Romans. First, “they were held down by a garrison quartered upon them.” Second, 
“they were obliged to receive tax- gatherers, or rather, harpies and leeches, who 
sucked out the blood of  the provinces” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 177). “The third 
form of  servitude,” he continues, “was the prohibition of  native provincial laws and 
the imposition of  magistrates bearing the authority and insignia of  the Roman peo-
ple, with the power to declare law in the provinces” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 179). In 
some of  Hotman’s exchanges with critics, he makes the analogy between past and 
present even more explicit. Just as Gaul was once subject to Roman tyranny, today, 
he says, France is infested by Italian mercenaries and tax collectors and subject to 
the will of  an Italian tyrant, Catherine de Medici (Kelley 1973, 242, 257).
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Hotman insists that the Gauls did not endure the Roman yoke easily but in fact 
frequently rebelled against their conquerors: “Tacitus relates that when Tiberius 
was Emperor, not so very long after Caesar’s conquests, the states of  Gaul rebelled 
against the continuation of  the tribute moneys, the ferocity of  the extortioners, 
and the proud insolence of  the soldiery.” Hotman also credits the Gauls as the 
first within the Roman empire to rebel against Emperor Nero: “We cannot offer 
sufficiently high praise for the worth of  our ancestors because they were the first in 
the world to begin to remove from their necks the yoke of  so powerful a tyrant, and 
to claim for themselves release from so monstrous an oppressor” (Hotman [1573] 
1972, 179).
Although the Gauls never lost hope of  recovering their liberty, they did not 
have enough fighting men to throw off the Roman yoke, and for that reason “they 
took to that ancient custom of  hiring German mercenaries to come to their aid. 
In this way the first Frankish colonies began” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 179). “Our 
Franks” were also victims of  Roman tyranny and sought the recovery of  their own 
liberty and independence: “When the Franks had left their own territories with this 
intent, they freed Gaul as well as their own German fatherland from Roman tyr-
anny” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 209). The struggle of  the Gauls and Franks for their 
liberty lasted some 200 years until at last, in 450 AD, they succeeded in driving the 
Romans out.
The ancestors of  the French, the Franks and the Gauls succeeded in throwing 
off the yoke of  the world’s greatest empire, which had long robbed them of  their 
freedom to rule themselves through their public councils and live in accordance 
with their own native laws. If  they could recover their liberty then, the French na-
tion today may do so again, and, unless the present generation wishes to dishonor 
and disgrace the ancestors, it must do so. The account is a call to arms to expel 
foreign occupiers and restore the ancient liberties of  the nation, just as the ances-
tors did. Moreover, the authority and legitimacy of  Roman law in France, alleged 
by absolutists because it put the king above the law, is overthrown. From the legal 
point of  view, there could be no claim that Roman law continued to be in force in 
France, for it was expelled from France together with the Romans themselves.13 But 
there is also a more emotive aspect to Hotman’s answer to those who claim that 
the king of  France should be absolute, just as the Roman emperors were above the 
law. It is as if  to say “which laws would you have us adopt, the tyrannical laws of  
the Roman emperors, under which our great- souled ancestors groaned, until, at 
13. This is one reason it was important that Hotman show “French, (or Francogallican) fundamental 
law developed autochthonously” (Giesey 1967, 587).
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last, driven by the memory of  their former glory and pent up resentment, they rose 
up against these foreigners and their foreign laws and sent them packing out of  
our country?” The expulsion of  the Romans negates the absolutist argument from 
conquest. Having seen their former conquerors off, the Franks and the Gauls were 
free to form a new state and constitution on the basis of  their own native customs.
The constitution of  France, according to Hotman, was preserved, in the same 
essential form since the Gauls and Franks threw off the Roman yoke, owing to 
their nation’s courage and zeal for liberty. “Our commonwealth,” he says, “which 
was founded and established upon liberty, retained that free and holy condition for 
more than eleven centuries, and even resisted the power of  tyrants by armed force” 
(Hotman [1573] 1972, 447). The ancestors, then, throughout the ages, had been 
precisely the sort of  citizens described in his preface: men who loved the fatherland 
as much as Odysseus did his Ithaca, and who, therefore, would not, for the sake of  
personal pleasure or comfort, abandon it, or its free constitution, to the tyranny of  
an ambitious or corrupt king. Members of  all three of  the great dynasties of  French 
kings, the Merovingians, the Carolingians, and the Capetians had presented chal-
lenges to French liberty, but the nation held its own against them all. Charlemagne 
“acquired nearly all Europe as his kingdom,” yet he was “unable to deprive the 
Franks of  their pristine right and liberty” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 393). Most re-
cently, in 1460 “the magnates of  the kingdom . . . aroused by the continued queries 
and complaints of  the common people” against the corruption of  King Louis XI, 
assembled an army to prosecute what became known as “the War of  the Common 
Weal” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 441–443). Their first demand had been to convoke 
the assembly of  the three estates to redress the grievances of  the commonwealth. 
This, he says, was done, following which, the assembly chose twelve guardians from 
each of  the three estates with “authority to reform the commonwealth, and relieve 
the common people of  the burden of  taxes and exactions.” King Louis XI agreed 
to abide by the decisions of  the guardians and, when he broke his promise, was met 
with further armed resistance that continued for years. All of  this, says Hotman, is 
proof  that “less than century ago the liberty of  Francogallia and the authority of  
the solemn council flourished” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 447).
In the final chapter of  Francogallia, Hotman presents the reader with a new ex-
ample of  Roman tyranny, the current condition of  France. Although he generally 
avoids explicitly Protestant polemic, here the Church of  Rome is represented as 
a conduit for tyrannical and corrupt political practices based on Roman law. The 
Popes brought back to France the laws of  the Roman emperors that the ancient 
Gauls and Franks had expunged. Hotman refers to a letter of  Pope Leo to Louis II, 
in which he “begs that same emperor for his clemency and wishes the constitutions 
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of  Roman Law everywhere to be observed” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 523). The 
popes kept Roman law alive and spread it, like an infection, to France by pleading 
that “the constitutions of  Roman law be everywhere observed.” The present insti-
tutional embodiment of  Roman Law and Roman tyranny for Hotman is the parle-
ments and chief  among them the parlement of  Paris. He compares the parlement to the 
Senate in imperial Rome, an assembly composed of  lawyers who have gained the 
wealth and power of  “satraps and kings” owing to privileges afforded them by their 
proximity to the imperial court. The parlement began as an attempt by the Capetian 
kings to increase their own power by subverting the ancient constitution of  France: 
“As the authority of  the council [the Estates General] was supreme, the Capetians 
endeavoured to diminish it and substitute a number of  approved judges for the 
council. Then they transferred the august name of  parliament to the Senate. . . .” 
(Hotman [1573] 1972, 503). The assembly of  the three estates has been supplanted 
by a “spurious senate” not representative of  or accountable to the nation (Hotman 
[1573] 1972, 499).
The ancient free constitution of  Francogallia, Hotman concludes, has been 
utterly subverted and replaced with something like the tyrannical regime of  the 
Roman Empire. The solution is announced already in the preface: the cause of  
France’s present troubles is the subversion, some one hundred years earlier, of  “the 
excellent institutions designed by our ancestors . . . our commonwealth will return 
to health when it is restored by some divine act of  beneficence into its ancient, and, 
so to speak, natural state” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 143). Now, at the end, the reader 
is left to conclude that, just as eleven decades before, the French nation is afflicted 
by the same foreign tyranny. It becomes, therefore, a sacred duty for true sons of  
the fatherland, whose ancestors preserved their native, authentic liberty against 
tyrants foreign and domestic, to remember the unity and patriotic zeal their nation 
once possessed, to throw off that foreign yoke again and restore ancient French 
liberty.
D. Representing the Nation: the Francogallican Mixed Constitution
Not only did the Gauls and Franks elect their first king, Childeric  I, but having 
found him to be given to insolence, luxury, and debauchery, they deposed him. 
Hotman comments: “this celebrated and remarkable deed of  our ancestors should 
be noted all the more carefully because it was done near the beginning and in the 
infancy of  the monarchy, as if  it were a witness and declaration that in Francogallia 
kings were created by fixed laws and were not constituted as tyrants with unbridled, 
free and unlimited authority” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 237). From the first, then, 
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owing to the traditions of  the Gauls and Franks, their courage and their love of  
liberty, the government of  Francogallia was established and maintained as a limited 
monarchy. Nor did the commitment of  the Francogallican nation to this form of  
government abate with the passage of  time. Hotman recounts many subsequent 
instances in which kings of  Francogallia were deposed by the leading men for ar-
bitrary rule, sloth, or failure to preserve the territorial integrity of  the kingdom 
(Hotman [1573] 1972, 239).
For Hotman, the public council, or assembly of  the three estates, was much 
more than a “bridle” to constrain the king or to depose him in an extreme case: it 
was “the highest administrative authority in the kingdom of  Francogallia” (Hot-
man [1573] 1972, 291).14 “The royal majesty,” he says “resides in that place where 
counsel is taken for the welfare of  the commonwealth,” that is, in the assembly, 
which, like the public councils of  Gaul before the Roman conquest, met annually. 
This assembly possessed all the powers of  sovereignty which absolutists attributed 
to the king alone: the power to decide all questions of  war and peace; the making 
of  public laws; the appointment of  honours, offices, and regencies; and, generally, 
“all those issues which in popular speech are now commonly called affairs of  state, 
since, by the highest authority of  many generations there was . . . no right for any 
part of  the commonwealth to be dealt with except in the council of  estates or or-
ders” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 333). By the highest authority of  many generations, 
that is to say, by the common law of  Francogallia, and, ultimately, France, the 
sovereignty of  the nation lay in the council of  the three estates, whose members, 
assembled together, represented the nation as a whole.
Hotman stresses the representative character of  the assembly. The Estates 
General of  France is not like a senate, which may offer advice to the king but, in 
practice, has no power. Such councils are not beholden to the nation and thus end 
up serving “the profit and convenience of  a single man.” The assembly of  the three 
estates is superior because of  the “amplitude of  advice” from a “large number of  
men of  prudence” drawn from “all the estates.” Those office- holders “foremost 
in the great affairs of  government” are “held in fear of  this council, in which the 
requests of  the provinces are freely heard” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 297, 299). Such a 
constitution as this was consistent with the principle of  government by the consent 
of  the governed, which, he affirms, was explicitly acknowledged by the ancient 
14. The other French monarchomachs, Beza and Du Plessis Mornay, emphasize the role of  the estates 
chiefly as a “bridle” to the king, although both also describe the former legislative and administrative 
powers of  the Estates and, like Hotman, lament their decline (Beza [1576] 1956, 60–61; de Mornay 
[1579] 1994, 86, 103, 117–118). 
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kings of  France. For evidence he cites Charlemagne’s Capitulary: “that, if  any new 
clauses be added to the law, the people should be consulted about them and, when 
all consented to the additions, they should sign their names in confirmation of  these 
clauses.” Hotman interprets: “It is manifest from these words that the people of  
France were formerly bound only by those laws which they had approved by their 
own votes in the assemblies” (Hotman [1573] 1972, 347).
The ancient constitution was also a composite regime, like those described 
by the ancients and “approved before all others by Cicero in his Republic,” “mixed 
and tempered from the three elements of  monarchy, aristocracy and democracy” 
(Hotman, 293). The division of  sovereignty among the king and the three estates, 
who sat and deliberated separately, is essential for a “tempered” government. Hot-
man concurs with Claude de Seyssel that such a constitution protects the interest 
of  all: “so long as the legal right and dignity of  each order is preserved, it is difficult 
for the kingdom to be overthrown. Each order has its fixed prerogative, and while 
that is maintained, one order cannot subvert the other.  .  .  .” These estates were, 
in the earliest times, the nobility and two orders of  deputies from the towns and 
provinces, one composed of  merchants and lawyers, and the other of  artisans and 
farmers (Hotman [1573] 1972, 293). Later, the clergy became one of  the estates, 
and the two orders of  commoners were merged to form the third estate (Hotman 
[1573] 1972, 445). The nobility play an essential role as intermediaries between the 
king and commoners since they “approach the status of  royalty” in virtue of  “the 
splendour and antiquity of  their stock” but at the same time share with those of  
plebeian birth the status of  subjects. The common good is better served when sov-
ereign decisions require the consent of  different orders with different interests and 
dispositions. As Cicero put it, “harmonious and agreeable concord is produced . . . 
through the consent of  dissimilar elements, drawn, like the sounds, from the highest 
and the middling orders, from the lowest and the intermediate estates” (Hotman 
[1573] 1972, 295).
The notion of  a mixed regime, promoted here by Hotman, in which the estates 
share sovereignty between them and watch over each other lest any one of  them 
attempt to subvert the powers of  the others or usurp all the sovereign powers for 
itself, is the source of  the idea of  constitutional checks and balances. In this, and 
in other descriptions of  the ancient constitution of  France, Hotman’s debt to the 
Roman republican tradition is evident (Kinneging 1997). But he is keen to show 
that this is an ancient and authentically French practice. Hotman added to the 
1586 edition of  the Francogallia an excerpt from a speech of  King Louis the Pious 
delivered to an assembly of  the three estates:
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[H]owever mighty this royal office may seem to be in our person, our office is 
known by both divine authority and human ordinance to be so divided through-
out its parts that each one of  you in his own place and rank may be recognised as 
possessing a piece. Hence it seems that we should be your counselor, and all of  you 
should be our deputies. And we are aware that it is fitting for each one of  you to 
have a piece of  authority vested in you (Hotman [1573] 1972, 295).
By the testimony of  the ancient kings of  France themselves, then, the sovereignty of  
the nation was divided between the king and the three estates.
Hotman’s notion of  mixed government also reflects a view of  the state as a 
community of  communities, rather than as a mass of  individuals with a “general 
will.” This is brought out further by his remarks on the rights of  the provinces ac-
cording to the ancient constitution. “It is clear,” he says, that no province “of  France 
was reserved or granted to the king, and in this respect all power was not bestowed 
upon him in the manner which the Roman people gave it to the emperors” (Hot-
man [1573] 1972, 417). Citing a description of  the provincial charters of  Toulouse 
and Languedoc concerning their union with France, Hotman makes it clear that 
the provinces reserve certain corporate rights within the kingdom, of  which, in ad-
dition to the most fundamental one, that is, the right of  each province to summon 
assemblies “to take public council for the benefit of  the province as a whole,” three 
are listed: first, that all provincial privileges and local law will be preserved inviolate; 
second, that the king will appoint no governor who is not a member of  a provincial 
family; third, that no taxes or other subsidies can be levied on the province by the 
king without the consent of  the provincial estates (Hotman [1573] 1972, 417). The 
provinces remain in obedience to the king provided that he does not violate their 
privileges. If  he does, then they have a right to disobey. It is clear, then, that Hot-
man’s conception of  nationhood and his understanding of  the ancient constitution 
in no way imply centralization of  authority or a power in the national government 
to dispense with or transform existing institutions, traditional customs, and rights. 
The French are all one nation (gens), but that nation is also divided into regions, each 
with variations in custom and law that are their own and with rights to local self- 
government. The public power to act in the name of  the nation, or its various parts, 
is spread among the orders and provinces of  which it is composed.15
15. Hotman did support a plan to codify French national law (concerning which, see Geisey 1961, 
and Davis 2006), but this is a far cry from the programs of  national homogenization of  the French 
Revolution. 
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IV. THE LEGACY OF THE FRANCOGALLIA: GROTIUS AND SELDEN
Hotman’s argument for constitutional government did not prevail in 16th century 
France, but the Francogallia proved influential on a variety of  English and Dutch 
thinkers. (Salmon, 1959; Hotman [1573]1972, 107–128). I focus on two important 
pro- constitutionalist texts in which the influence of  the Francogallia is obvious: Hugo 
Grotius’ The Antiquity of  the Batavian Republic, and John Selden’s The Reverse of  the 
English Janus. Several scholars have perceived that these texts were modeled on the 
Francogallia and have catalogued their authors’ various borrowings from Hotman 
(Christianson 1996, 13–15, Hotman [1573] 1972, 120; Toomer 2009, 102, 128). 
The same four nationalist themes seen in Francogallia appear here for Dutch and 
English audiences: Grotius and Selden both give flesh and bones to the pre- political 
community, the Batavians and the Saxons respectively; they describe community 
and citizenship in ethnocultural rather than in individualist or voluntarist terms; 
they tell a tale of  native liberty confronting foreign tyranny; and they defend a 
mixed constitution as the ancient and authentic form of  government of  their re-
spective nations. On the last aspect it should be noted that Grotius and Selden 
were themselves as familiar with original sources on the constitutional theory of  
the Roman Republic, especially the works of  Cicero, as was Hotman. Like Hot-
man, they adapt the theory of  the Roman mixed constitution to fit native institu-
tions. Grotius’ Latin text was immediately translated into Dutch and printed several 
times throughout the 17th century. Though Selden’s text appeared in 1610 only 
in Latin, its contents were popularized in English by members of  parliament and 
many other writers.
Grotius’ The Antiquity of  the Batavian Republic was commissioned by the States 
of  Holland and West- Friesland, the government of  the largest and most powerful 
province of  the Dutch Republic. Grotius defends the mixed federal constitution 
of  the Dutch against absolute monarchy, which, in spite of  the struggle for in-
dependence from Spain, had many supporters at Dutch universities and among 
prominent citizens in general. Grotius begins with the origins of  the community in 
ancient times. The people of  the Dutch provinces descend from the Batavians, and 
other kindred Germanic tribes such as Frisians and Mattiaci. The only natural right 
mentioned is that whereby “a people of  free origins” is entitled to take possession 
of  unoccupied land, a right that he says the Batavians exercised as a community 
(Grotius [1610] 2000, 57). In Grotius’ account, freedom is a thing that belongs to 
tribes and nations, and to citizens as members of  those communities.
Grotius contrasts Batavian liberty with foreign tyranny. Unlike slavish Oriental 
nations, who submit to a sovereign master, says Grotius, the Batavians elected their 
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kings, and made decisions for their republic in public councils composed of  nobles 
and deputies of  the people (Grotius [1610] 2000, 57, 59). The Batavians, he notes, 
were famous for their martial prowess and courage (Grotius [1610] 2000, 73). The 
tyrannical enemy who threatened Batavian liberty and tested Batavian courage, 
however, was the Roman Empire. Grotius recounts the already well-known story 
of  the uprising, led by the Batavian general Claudius Civilis in AD 69, to restore 
his nation’s freedom and independence from Rome. This narrative had been used 
to inspire Dutch resistance against the King of  Spain as early as 1575, by Janus 
Dousa, Grotius’ predecessor as historiographer of  Holland and a colleague of  
François Hotman. Dousa himself  may have been taking a page from the Francogallia 
when he composed his poem praising the lifting of  the Spanish siege of  Leiden as a 
feat worthy of  the Batavian ancestors who had repelled the Roman onslaught many 
centuries ago (Grotius [1610] 2000, 9). Grotius uses the story for an additional pur-
pose: a defense of  the constitution, noting that Civilis did not go to war against the 
Romans until the public council of  the two estates, nobility and people, had been 
convoked and had given him a mandate (Grotius [1610] 2000, 65).
The constitution that Grotius defends is a mixed regime, a council of  nobility 
and deputies from the towns “combined with a principate, subject to laws” (Gro-
tius [1610] 2000, 55). The legislative assembly in each province was the provin-
cial States. Executive power belonged to the provincial standing committees and, 
where applicable, to the prince, called the Stadholder. The Federal government, 
whose responsibilities were war, peace, and foreign alliances, had a similar struc-
ture: the States General, composed of  deputies from the provincial States, was the 
national legislative body. Executive power was in the hands of  the Stadholder, who 
was commander- in-chief  of  the army and navy, and his Council of  State (Grotius 
[1610] 2000, 109–111). This constitution, Grotius insists, closely resembled that 
of  the ancient Batavians. It avoided the abuses and errors that result from con-
centrating all power in one place and provided for the protection of  the rights of  
citizens, the rights of  towns and provinces to local self- government, and the defense 
of  the nation from its enemies. National experience and national honor demand, 
concludes Grotius, that the Dutch maintain the constitutional order they inherited 
from their illustrious ancestors.16
While Grotius was defending the constitution of  the Netherlands on Hotman-
esque grounds, John Selden was formulating similar arguments about the ancient 
constitution of  England. Two of  his early works were modeled on the Francogallia: 
16. For a more thorough examination of  Grotius’ constitutionalism, see Alexander-Davey 2016.
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Analecton Anglo- Britannicon (1605) and Jani Anglorum Altera Facies (1610). The former 
undermined the British version of  the Trojan myth supporting absolute monarchy 
by describing the aristocratic constitutions of  the ancient nations of  Anglo- Britain: 
the Britons and the Anglo- Saxons. As in the Francogallia, the Romans are described 
as conquerors who robbed the natives of  their ancestral liberty (Christianson 1996, 
13–14). In English Janus, there is a shift in emphasis, reflected in the title, to the 
Anglo- Saxons. The account of  the ancient Britons is not omitted, but Selden makes 
it clear that it is from the “Saxon Nation” that Englishmen inherit their customs 
and laws as well as their blood and bones. The first wave of  Saxons, led by Hengist 
and Horsa, was followed by successive waves from other Saxon regions of  the con-
tinent, who together conquered Britain and established in a new clime the customs 
and institutions by which they had lived in Germany (Selden 1683, 29). Here stands 
the pre- political community of  the English state.17
The germ of  Saxon liberty and Saxon government, says Selden, is the ancient 
public assembly which Tacitus had observed among the Germanic tribes on the 
continent. At these assemblies, the chief  person would stand before his fellow citi-
zens and “use the art of  perswading, rather than the power of  commanding” (1683, 
32). Public decisions depended on the approval of  those assembled. Such councils 
formed the basis of  the local, provincial, and national governments of  the Saxons 
in England. At the local level, a chief  person administered justice together with a 
hundred associates chosen “out of  the Commonalty.” This institution survived in 
Selden’s day as the Hundred Courts (Selden 1683, 32). English kings governed the 
nation together with Wittena Gemotes, councils of  wisemen, and Micel Gemotes, Great 
councils (Selden 1683, 94). These practices were observed as customs of  the nation 
for centuries: the constitution and the laws were finally collected and written down 
by order of  King Edward the Confessor and known thereafter as St. Edward’s 
Laws (Selden 1683, 38).
The foreign challenge to Saxon liberty came with the Norman invasion. King 
James I had published, before his accession to the English throne, The Trew Law of  
Free Monarchies (1598), in which he claimed that William the Conqueror had over-
turned the Saxon constitution and established an absolute monarchy in England 
(Alexander- Davey 2014, 465–469). Selden, like his elder and more prominent col-
league, Sir Edward Coke, who had for several years asserted that the common law 
of  England had survived the Conquest, rejects King James’s account and offers 
17. George Lawson, a critic of  the theories of  Thomas Hobbes, would later treat the concept of  
the pre- political community with greater theoretical sophistication than either Selden or Hotman 
(Alexander- Davey 2014).
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his own: that although William of  Normandy desired to dispense with England’s 
constitution and rule according to laws of  his own choosing, he was thwarted by 
English Barons who demanded that he govern in accordance with St. Edward’s 
Laws, in which point William acquiesced (Selden 1683, 48–49).18 The Norman 
King failed to live up to his agreement, as did his successors, William Rufus and 
Stephen, but as England proved ungovernable without its ancient constitution, 
Henry I, in his first act as king, restored St. Edward’s Laws (Selden 1683, 62). By 
Selden’s account, then, liberty was preserved by the vigilance and the persistence 
of  the English nation.
According to the mixed constitution that had survived from Saxon times, the 
law- making power in England is vested in a “General Assembly” of  “the Three 
Estates, the King, the Lords, and the Commons, or Deputies of  the People” (Selden 
1683, 93–94). Selden quotes King Ina, in the original Anglo- Saxon, to show that 
the Saxon Kings did not make law without the consent of  the assembled estates. 
He also quotes the same passage from Cicero that appears in the Francogallia (see 
page 54) to make the same point: that harmony and security are the fruits of  a gov-
ernment that takes account of  the will and the interests of  the different orders that 
compose the nation. Selden gives no call to action in the English Janus, but his nar-
rative appears repeatedly in the political speeches and tracts of  other Englishmen 
throughout the century. In 1610, William Hakewill, Member of  Parliament (MP) 
for Bossiney, challenged King James I’s assertion of  a right to impose taxes with-
out consent of  parliament on grounds that the power to tax, like other legislative 
powers, was vested jointly in King, Lords, and Commons (Greenberg 2001, 162). 
Several MPs appealed to the “laws of  St. Edward the Confessor” in the debates 
on the Petition of  Right in 1628 (Greenberg 2001, 166–168). After the conflict be-
tween King Charles and parliament had erupted into violence, William Prynne was 
commissioned by parliament to make a constitutional case for resistance against 
the King. Prynne, who also cites the Francogallia in his series of  tracts, The Sover-
eigne Power of  Parliaments and Kingdomes (1643), intensifies Selden’s story about Saxon 
vigilance before Norman kings. William of  Normandy acquiesced, says Prynne, 
because he feared he would be deposed and killed by Saxons who had begun a 
rebellion against him (Greenberg 2001, 220). Any King who denied the English 
nation its ancestral rights ought to fear the same fate. Prynne also later penned a 
18. See the prefaces to Sir Edward Coke’s Reports. Selden’s Saxon barons standing up for their native 
laws, however, have no part in Coke’s telling of  the story (Coke 2003, Vol. 1, 245–248). On the differ-
ences between Coke’s account of  the Norman Conquest, and that of  Selden and other parliamentar-
ians, see Sommerville (1986). 
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Hotmanesque defense of  the rights of  English counties and corporations to local 
self- government, free from the meddling of  king or parliament (Prynne 1656, 34). 
Thus, in England also, constitutional liberty was defended by appeals to the honor, 
courage, and vigor of  ancestors.
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT MODERNS MAY 
LEARN FROM FRANCOIS HOTMAN
The rise of  constitutional self- government in early modern Europe owes much to 
a nationalist liberation narrative pioneered by François Hotman in the Francogallia. 
The text itself  was influential in the battles for sovereignty in England and the 
Netherlands. For the political theorist it is a particularly useful text, for it presents 
with remarkable clarity and explicitness the whole range of  nationalistic arguments 
and rhetorical devices employed by early- modern thinkers in support of  constitu-
tional liberty.
The fact that nationalist narratives such as that of  Francogallia played an im-
portant role in the early modern battle for constitutional self- government lends 
additional support to many of  the assertions of  scholars of  nationalism such as 
Canovan and Yack, that constitutional self- government, even in those countries 
where it has long been established, depends on feelings of  national solidarity, that 
defenses of  popular sovereignty tend to turn to the nation as a concrete histori-
cal entity with ethnic components, and that it is therefore problematic to assume 
that democratic politics can transcend nationalism or that nationalism can be fully 
transformed in the direction of  liberal inclusivity.
The Francogallia also reflects a conception of  nationhood much less given to 
the extremes of  the nationalism that developed in late 18th century France and 
evolved into even more dangerous forms in the 19th and 20th centuries. The un-
derstanding of  the nation as a society of  orders or estates, with different humors 
and interests and as a body composed of  provinces, each with their own variations 
on national customs, their own local interests and reserved rights and privileges, is 
not compatible with the rationalistic, homogenizing, and centralizing nationalism 
of  Emmanuel Sieyes. For Hotman, and for his counterparts in the Netherlands and 
England, the latter form of  nationalism was not even a possibility. Later thinkers, 
such as Montesquieu, Burke, and Tocqueville would explicitly defend a concep-
tion of  nationhood in which the corps intermediaires were essential to preserving the 
liberties of  the nation and its members. Indeed, this is the conception of  nation-
hood that underlay the struggle for national independence in the Netherlands and 
for limited monarchy in England. It is perhaps here that we should look for the 
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difference between a moderate nationalism, compatible with the idea of  constitu-
tional government, and the extreme forms born of  Enlightenment rationalism that 
Hont and Greenfeld describe, rather than in a turn away from a possibly mythical 
early- modern individualism to collectivism.
For those interested in the preservation and promotion of  constitutional self- 
government, the Francogallia may merit study and contemplation. Without making 
any suggestion that Hotman’s 16th century nationalism could or ought to be resur-
rected, it may be appropriate to consider some of  the advantages of  his conception. 
To speak of  the advantages of  a particular variety of  nationalism is not to deny the 
dangers of  nationalism as such. One could catalogue instances of  nationalist vio-
lence through the ages ad infinitum and ad nauseam. The important question for the 
political theorist is how to respond to such historical facts. One possible response 
is to become a cosmopolitan and insist that national identities be overcome, or be 
so attenuated that no- one can be excluded from them, and no- one will wish to 
fight over them. Another is to conclude that the history of  nations and nationalism 
points to an enduring quality in human nature, which cannot be expunged and 
therefore must be, as far as possible, contained and channelled toward positive po-
litical ends. The latter is the view of  many scholars of  nationalism, such as Steven 
Grosby (1994) and Walker Connor (1994). Hotman and those who wrote tracts 
like his in the Netherlands and England take it for granted that man is “a national 
animal” and make their appeals on that basis (Connor 1994, 195).
For its time, the nationalism of  Hotman is a good example of  one that is both 
contained and channeled toward positive political ends. In the first place, it is a 
telluric rather than a messianic nationalism. Telluric nationalism is concerned 
merely with the preservation of  a people’s way of  life within its national bound-
aries (Schmitt 1962, 92). Messianic nationalism posits the superiority of  a chosen 
nation, whether on account of  divine favor, racial and cultural qualities, or a more 
advanced stage of  enlightenment, and assumes a special duty and a unique ability 
to spread the true religion, to impose order or visit destruction upon the inferior, or 
to bring enlightenment to ignorant nations. Such nationalisms, which Eric Voegelin 
termed “political religions,” are less susceptible to being contained, for their aspira-
tions are universal and dogmatic (Voegelin 2000).
Although Hotman, Grotius, and Selden do not draw distinctions between 
different kinds of  nationalism, there are explicit and implied moral judgments in 
the comparisons they make between their ancestors and the Romans. The Gauls, 
Franks, Batavians, and Anglo- Saxons, they tell us, were fierce and brave conquerors, 
but the signal achievement of  these tribes was their success in carving out for them-
selves a national territory in which they could live in freedom and in accordance 
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with their own customs and laws. To preserve their distinctive way of  life on their 
land these nations had to repel, subdue, or assimilate invaders, but they were not 
like the Romans who sought conquest throughout the known world and gloried in 
their dominion over other nations. Theirs is thus a telluric, a defensive, and not a 
messianic nationalism.
The other potentially advantageous features of  Hotman’s conception are dis-
closed more clearly in the texts. His nationalism is restrained by the mediaeval 
conception of  the nation as a community of  communities, in which the subordinate 
communities have strong claims on the loyalty of  citizens and the institutional ca-
pacity to mobilize them. It assumes that national unity is maintained, in large part, 
by the good feelings of  citizens for their conationals, by their recognition of  what 
they have in common, by shared memories of  past victories and sorrows, such that 
they have no need of  a Louis XIV, much less a Robespierre, to tell them who they 
are and what they should do. Finally, and this is the central matter of  the present 
essay, it is a nationalism whose energy is channeled toward a positive political end: 
the maintenance of  constitutional liberty and self- government.
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